The reason to begin this blog with Cārvāka Darśana is that most people nowadays are, knowingly or unknowingly, Cārvākas to some extent. Cārvāka Darśana is the only Indian Philosophical school that brings the focus back to this world and body, rejecting transcendental entities altogether and also saving Indian Philosophy from dogmatism. Metaphysics is a result of Epistemology i.e. what one believes about reality is a result of what they think is a valid source of knowledge.
Cārvāka’s epistemology is quite straightforward: “Pratyakṣameva ekam Pramāṇam” - they consider Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa (i.e. Perception) as the only true source of knowledge. Perception is possible only if material objects come in contact with our sense organs. Hence, material objects must exist in the reality - Cārvāka take it a step further by asserting that the reality consists of material objects only (Materialism/Jāḍavāda) . They accomplish this by denying all other source of knowledge besides perception (we’ll discuss their metaphysics in more detail in a future post).
Thus, Cārvāka Darśana holds that we should believe in existence of something only if it can be perceived by us. While this might sound similar to “Esse Est Percipi” of Berkeley, the two are fundamentally different. Without going too deep into it, Berkeley’s view allows for perception by any conscious being - not necessarily us. But the Cārvāka view asserts that something exists only if we ourselves can perceive it.
The main focus of this article, however, is on how Cārvāka Darśana rejects causality. To understand this, we must first examine how it rejects inference (Anumāna Pramāṇa) as a valid means of acquiring knowledge:
Observation: There is smoke on the hill
Known Universal Fact: Where there is smoke, there is fire
Inferred (from above two): There must be fire on the hill
For Inference, we go from Pratyakṣa (direct observation) to Anumāna (inference) using a Vyāpti, which is a known universal connection between two phenomena. Vyāpti therefore is the nerve centre of Anumāna Pramāṇa i.e. it serves as the logical foundation that makes inference possible. For inference to be considered a valid source of knowledge, Vyāpti must be universal, unconditional, and necessary. Otherwise, the knowledge obtained through inference would be subject to exceptions and corner cases, making it unreliable.
Returning to the example above, Cārvāka argues that to prove Vyāpti is universal, necessary, and unconditional, we need to observe all the instances of smoke possible. Only if fire is present in every single case of smoke could we be certain that “Where there is smoke, there is fire”. But can we observe all the possible occurrences of smoke - past, present, and future? Obviously not. Hence, the Cārvāka school contends that we can never be certain of the universality of any Vyāpti. Just as a single white crow disproves the generalization “All crows are black” (a classic case of fallacy of illicit generalization), any single counter-example can undermine our Vyāpti.
If the founders of the Cārvāka school were alive today to see smoke machines on dance floors producing smoke without fire, they might have had their “Aha!” moment.
Inductive logic works by generalizing from a few observed cases (Particulars) to a broad, universal rule. For instance: after seeing many black crows, we conclude that all crows are black. By attacking the very basis of Vyāpti, Cārvāka rejects the validity of knowledge derived through inductive logic and inference.
This is why modern science emphasizes the need to falsify hypotheses rather than merely confirm them. To test “All crows are black,” we actively look for a white crow. A hypothesis is only considered reliable when it resists falsification - this is the very essence of the scientific method. But even with this safeguard, it cannot be denied that science is ultimately built on inductive logic. Interestingly, David Hume, a Western philosopher and empiricist, raised similar doubts about the foundations of induction and science.
Now, consider the theory of causality, which claims that every effect must have a cause, and this cause-effect relationship must be necessary, invariable, and unconditional. However, if we rely only on perception, as the Cārvāka epistemology demands, we can’t really observe any invariable relation between two events. What we perceive is merely that one event follows another. When two events occur together on a number of occassions, then this produces an expectation in our mind that they will always go together.
Again, this is inductive reasoning at play - we take a few observed cases of co-occurrence and project them into a necessary relationship. Thus, the cause effect relationship is a mere psychological necessity (as we have become habituated to associate the two events together) and not an objective necessity (the link of causality is nowhere to be found in the object itself). This is how more than 2500 years ago, Cārvāka Darśana essentially pointed out “Correlation doesn’t imply Causality”.
In questioning the foundations of knowledge, perhaps Cārvāka leaves us with more to unlearn than to learn.
Thanks for reading – if this challenged your assumptions, the Cārvākas would be pleased!